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The effects of technological change on wage inequality are usually studied under the 
assumption of exogenous supplies of skilled and unskilled workers. Moreover, in 
these studies there is no distinction between the stock (number of workers) and the 
flow (hours of work) dimension of labour services. In the present paper we 
construct a model in which hours of work and technological change affect both the 
(relative) demand and supply of unskilled workers. The labour supply of unskilled 
workers (numbers of persons) is derived from a model of household labour supply 
in which households differ regarding the disutility suffered when both household 
members work. Combining together the (relative) supply and demand parts of the 
model we are able to study the effects of technological change on wage and income 
inequality and to provide an explanation of recent trends more consistent with the 
stylized facts. 
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1. Introduction 
 
One of the well-known facts of the last two decades has been the deterioration of the 
economic position of less-skilled workers in some OECD countries. In the United 
States, for example, the ratio of earnings of the 90th percentile of the wage 
distribution to the 10th percentile increased sharply from 2.66 to 3.66 between 1971 
and 1995 (see, Freeman (1995)). Almost all of the research effort during the last 
decade has assumed that the rise in the relative wage of college-educated workers (the 
so-called “skill-premium”) has been due to a rise the (relative) demand for skilled (i.e. 
college-educated) workers and has tried to uncover the factors responsible for this 
shift in the (relative) demand for skilled labour.
1 The initial response of some authors 
was to link this development to increased trade exposure with low-wage countries, 
both as a source of imports and as hosts for foreign investors. This explanation has 
been mostly discredited as it has been  pointed out that trade between the North and 
the South is still too small to have had a significant effect on Northern labour markets 
(for an opposite view, see Wood (1994)). The favoured explanation among empirical 
researchers regarding the causes of these changes is skill-biased technological change 
(SBTC) which has improved the wage and employment prospects of relatively skilled 
workers, while simultaneously damaging the wage and employment prospects of less 
skilled workers (see, for example, Juhn et al (1993), Berman et al (1997), and Machin 
and Van Reenen (1998)).  
 
The standard theoretical framework for examining the effects of technological change 
on the skill premium implies that  in order for  SBTC  to be able to explain the recent 
rise in inequality, the elasticity of substitution between skilled and unskilled workers 
must be greater than 1(e.g., Acemoglu (2002)). However, the empirical evidence 
about the elasticity of substitution between skilled and unskilled workers provides 
little support for this assumption. Despite the inherent difficulties in estimating this 
elasticity of substitution (since the data involve substitution both within and across 
industries), the evidence suggests that, more likely than not, it is less than 1 (see, for 
example, the extensive review of the literature in Hammermesh (1993)). It would thus 
appear that SBTC is an unlikely explanation of the rise in the skill premium. 
                                                 
1 Gordon (1995) has  argued that the rise in inequality may be due to the fact that US firms have 
decided that it is more profitable for them to use overbloated bureaucracies (instead of high wages) in   3
Nevertheless, in the present paper we show that once we allow for technological 
change to impact not only on the relative demand for (un)skilled workers, but on their 
relative supply as well, the hypothesis of SBTC can explain the rise in inequality even 
when the elasticity of substitution between skilled and unskilled workers is less than 
1.  This is potentially important since failure to establish technological change as a 
main cause of the rise in inequality may imply that either trade liberalization and/or 
domestic policy changes were the driving forces, thus potentially creating the political 
climate for inappropriate policy responses (e.g. anti-globalization movement, etc.).  
 
A common feature of the papers dealing with the effects of technological change is 
their exclusive focus on the relative demand for (un)skilled workers: whereas relative 
labour demand is assumed to respond directly to technological change, the relative 
supply of (un)skilled workers is assumed constant
2. In this paper we first construct a 
general equilibrium model in which technological change, impacts not only on the 
relative demand of (un)skilled workers but on the relative supply as well. This is 
accomplished by explicit modelling of the labour force participation decision in 
households comprised of two   potential     participants in the labour market. We 
assume that households differ not only with respect to the composition of skills each 
household member is endowed with, but also with respect to the disutility suffered 
when both household members are participating in the labour force. Thus we are able 
to derive the aggregate relative supply of unskilled workers as a positive function of 
the real (hourly) unskilled wage and a negative function of (the exogenously given) 
hours of work. As we explain in the following section, the evidence presented in 
Blundell and McCurdy (1999) and Blau and Kahn (2005) lends support to the 
empirical relevance of this function.  
 
The implications which follow from having the aggregate supply of unskilled workers 
being -ceteris paribus- a positive function of the real wage, are as follows. First, skill-
biased technological progress can result in an increase in wage inequality (i.e., the 
skill premium) even if the elasticity of substitution between skilled and unskilled 
                                                                                                                                            
order to “discipline” their workers.   
2 An exception is the work of Gregg and Manning (1996) who postulate that labour supply is a function 
of the relative wage rate between skilled and unskilled workers. In addition, many authors have 
examined empirically the impact of  changes in labour supply on the cross-country patterns of 
inequality (e.g. Card et al (1999), Murphy et al (1998)).   4
workers is less than 1. Second, we show that neutral technological progress can 
increase the skill premium, independently of the value of the elasticity of 
substitution.
3 Both of these findings follow as a consequence of the increase in the 
relative supply of unskilled workers, which results from the positive impact of 
technological progress on the real wages of the unskilled. Third, changes in the 
(sometimes institutionally set) working time of unskilled workers can impact on the 
skill premium, thus providing another (partial) explanation for the diverging trends in 
inequality between the United States and the United Kingdom on one hand and 
continental European countries on the other (see, Freeman and Katz (1995), and 
Gottschalk and Smeeding (1999) for the relevant evidence). 
 
In the remainder of the paper, we first present the model (section 2), and then proceed 
to analyze the effects of neutral and biased technological change, as well as the effects 
of changes in hours of work on the skill premium and the real wages of the unskilled 
(section 3). Section 4 concludes the paper and offers some caveats of our analysis.  
 
2. The Model 
 We describe a perfectly competitive economy, producing a single good (Q) with the 
use of skilled (S) and unskilled (L) labour.  
 
 2.1  Firms  
The production function is assumed to take the CES form  
     
1 {( ) ( ) } L S QAA L A S
ρ ρ ρ / =⋅ +                                                                                     (1) 
 
where  A is a constant reflecting the state of technology,  L A  and  S A  are factor 
augmenting technology terms, and  1 ρ ≤ .   The elasticity of substitution between 
skilled and unskilled workers in this production function is  1( 1 ) σ ρ ≡ /− .  The value of 
the elasticity of substitution is of crucial importance in this framework since, 
depending on it, an increase in, for example,  S A  can be considered as a force 
                                                 
3 For a demonstration of the same phenomenon in the context of a two-sector general equilibrium 
model with vertically-differentiated products, see Moutos (2000).   
   5
"complementing" or "replacing" skilled workers.  
 
In equation (1), S  measures the number of skilled workers, whereas  ( ) Lf h N =, , 
with h being the (legislated) hours per worker per period and N  the number of 
unskilled workers. In other words, we assume that the labour services of skilled 
workers are defined only by the number of them, whereas the labour services of 
unskilled workers are a function of the number of unskilled workers and hours per 
worker. This distinction between skilled and unskilled workers is made in order to 
capture the fact that skilled workers are involved in more than "turn-key" procedures, 
and that their contribution to production is to some extent independent of the number 
of hours spent at the factory. In any case, the prevalence of salaries (rather than 
wages) as the mode of compensation among skilled workers testifies to the (relative) 
unimportance of conventionally set hours of work as a determinant of labour services 
for skilled workers. Moreover, as Coleman and Pencavel (1993) and Costa (1998) 
have documented for the United States, since 1940 there have been ongoing decreases 
in the (weekly) hours of work for those with a high school education or less, and 
increases in the hours of work for the college educated. Thus, it appears that the 
legislated hours of work set a standard only for the less-skilled workers. It is also 
worth noting that the qualitative nature of our results would remain largely intact had 
we assumed that average hours of work influence the amount of labour services 
performed by skilled workers, as long as it does so at a lesser extent than for unskilled 
workers.  
 
The specification of the labour services function is a crucial issue in models 
examining the impact of changes in hours of work on labour demand under the 
assumption of perfectly elastic labour supply (see, for example, Hart (1987) and Hart 
and Moutos (1995)). In the present context it is less important since employment is 
determined jointly with an upward sloping labour supply curve (see the following 
subsection). For this reason, and in order to keep the model tractable, we adopt the 
following simple specification of the labour services function,  
 
L hN =       .                                                                                                                 (2)  
                                                                                                                                                                           6
This specification implies that (unskilled) labour productivity is not affected by 
changes in the hours of work. There exist strong arguments that lend support to the 
possibility of either a rise or a fall in labour productivity following a reduction in 
hours of work. For example, a reduction in hours of work may help to increase 
(hourly) productivity due to a reduction in fatigue and boredom. On the opposite side, 
suppose that a significant part of a firm’s effective man-hours are devoted to machine 
set-up time. A fall in hours of work may, in this case, cause a reduction in 
productivity since proportionally less time is devoted to direct production activity. 
Unfortunately, the empirical evidence has been less than clear-cut in this respect (see, 
Hart (1987)). For this reason, no attempt is made to integrate the (uncertain) 
productivity effects of changes in hours of work in this paper
4.  
 
The cost-minimizing demands for factor services corresponding to production 
function (1) are,   
 
1 1 ( 1 )( 1 )( 1 )( 1 ) ( 1 )( 1 ) 1 [] DD L L S Lh NQ A w A w A r A
ρ ρρ ρρ ρρ ρρ ρρ ρ − /− − /− /− − /− /− − /− − / == +                    (3)     
  
1 1 ( 1 )( 1 )( 1 )( 1 ) ( 1 )( 1 ) 1 [] DS L S SQ A r A w A r A
ρ ρρ ρρ ρρ ρρ ρρ ρ − /− − /− /− − /− /− − /− − / =+                                (4)  
 
where  D L  and  D S  stand for the demand of unskilled and skilled labour services 
(respectively), w is the hourly wage rate of  unskilled workers and r  is the wage rate 
of skilled workers. The resulting average cost,  AC , (and thus, price P ) function is 
 
 PA C = = 
1 (1 ) (1 ) (1 ) (1 ) (1 ) [] LS Aw A r A
ρρ ρρ ρρ ρρ ρ ρ − /− − /− /− − /− − / +     .                                       (5)  
We note that the average cost is not directly dependent on hours of work, an 
implication of our assumption that productivity is hours independent. However, to the 
extent that factor prices may depend on hours worked, average costs (and thus prices) 
may be not be hours independent once the general equilibrium repercussions are taken 
into account.  
                                                 
4A related issue concerns the use of overtime hours. Firms using overtime may respond to a cut in 
standard hours of work by increasing overtime, since it results in a rise in the marginal cost of an 
additional worker relative to the marginal cost of overtime (for more details, see  Hart (2004)). For 
simplicity, and with some loss of generality, we assume that hours worked are equal to (legislated) 
standard hours.   7
2. 2  Households  
Households consist of two potential participants in the labour market. There are three 
possible groups of households, depending on the type of household members: (S, S), 
(S, L),  and (L, L). We assume that all skilled individuals participate in the labour 
market and, since the labour market clears, that all skilled individuals work. This 
assumption is made in order to capture both the idea that skill acquisition is a 
purposeful activity, and the fact that the proportion of labour market participation 
among skilled workers is significantly higher than for the unskilled for both men and 
women (see, Blundell and McCurdy (1999)). 
5  It is worth noting that our results do 
not hinge on assuming that all skilled individuals participate in the labour force. 
Indeed, as long as the own wage elasticity of labour supply of skilled individuals is 
smaller than the corresponding wage elasticity of unskilled individuals, then the 
qualitative nature of our results would remain intact. The existing econometric 
evidence provides clear support for this hypothesis, and more so for female workers 
who are usually the secondary household earner (see, Blundell and McCurdy (1999) 
and Blau and Kahn (2005)). We also assume that in every household, at least one of 
its members is willing to work, and thus is employed. Consequently, for household 
groups (S, L) and (L, L), it is possible to have the second household member either 
being a member of the labour force (and thus working) or not. Thus, taking into 
account labour market participation the possible household groups are: (S, S), (S, 
L) P , (S, L ) NP , (L, L ) P , (L, L ) NP , with the subscripts P and NP standing for 
participation and non-participation, respectively. Accordingly, there are five  groups 
in the economy, with the following incomes (respectively): 2r, r+w, r, 2w, w.  
 
We assume that households differ in only one aspect regarding their preferences, 
namely the disutility experienced when the second household member works. Utility 
depends on consumption, C and on leisure (or, alternatively, on the amount of home 
production which leisure can produce),  
 
i
ii UCh a h
π =− − ,        1 i π >                                                                                    (6)   
 
                                                 
5 An interesting extension of the present paper  may involve the modeling of the proccess by which 
individuals decide to acquire  skills.   8
with   i π  being a parameter which varies across households, and  1( 0) a = =  when the 
second household member works (does not work), respectively. Households 
maximize utility subject to the budget constraint  
 
12 ii i PC y ay ,, =+ ,    
                                                                                                                                           
with  yr =  for skilled workers, and  yw h =  for unskilled workers. It is worth noting 
that since all skilled individuals work,  2 yw h =  for household groups (S, L) and (L, 
L). A household belonging to these two groups will have both of its members working 
if   10 aa UU == >. Thus, for the marginal household (which is indifferent between 
sending its second member to work and enjoying the extra consumption of market-
produced goods, and the home production (or leisure) which having the second 
member at home implies), it holds that  
 
m wh P h
π /= ,    
                                                                                                                                    
with the subscript m  denoting the marginal household.  Let E  denote the real hourly 
wage ( ) wp =/ for unskilled workers. Then,  m Eh h
π = , which implies that  
 
1 (ln ln ) m Eh π =+ / .                                                                                        (7)   
 
We now assume that π  is uniformly distributed in the interval (1,  1 z ] among 
households in the group (S, L), and  in the interval (1,  2] z  among the (L, L) 
households
6. Let  1 K  and  2 K  be the numbers of households belonging to the two 
groups. Then,  
 
11 1( ( 1 ) ) i zK i π =+ −/ ⋅ ,         1 1 m ii K = ,.. ..,  
  
                                                 
6 It may be reasonable to assume that the value attached to leisure by an unskilled worker who lives 
with a skilled worker is likely to be higher than one who lives with an unskilled worker, because 
consumption is, to some extent at least, spread within the household. The results of our analysis do not 
in any way depend on abstracting from this issue.   9
22 1( ( 1 ) ) j zK j π =+ −/ ⋅,       2 1 m j jK = ,.. .., .     
 
Let  m i  and  m j  stand for the marginal household in the two groups. Accordingly,  
 
11 1( ( 1 ) ) mi m zK i π , =+ −/ ⋅   
 
22 1( ( 1 ) ) mj m zK j π , =+ −/ ⋅    ,                                                                                                     
 
and the marginal households are defined as  
 
11 (( 1) ( 1)) mm i iz K π , =− / −                                                                                            (8a)  
 
22 (( 1) ( 1)) mm j j zK π , =− / −  .                                                                      (8b)   
 







S j L di dj dj =+ + ∫∫ ∫                                                                                (9)                               
 
The first term (of the right-hand-side of equation (9)) counts those (S, L) households 
for which  im i π π , <  , thus those having the second (unskilled) member offering her/his 
labour services to the market. The second term counts those (L, L) households for 
which  jm j π π , <  , thus those having both (unskilled) members participating. The third 
term counts the rest of the (L, L) households (those with  jm j π π , >  ) for which only 
the first member is working. Using equations (7) and (8) we calculate the aggregate 




21 (1 ) l n (1 ) l n (1 ) ( ) EE
S zh zh LK K −− =+ +                                                       (10)                                         
 
We note that the labour supply (number of persons) of unskilled workers is increasing 
in the real hourly wage () E  and decreasing in the hours of work () h . In what follows   10
we will assume that although changes in the hours of work induce changes in the 
number of unskilled workers in the opposite direction, the supply of unskilled labour 
services changes in the same direction.  
 
3.  Analysis 
Let  3 K  denote the number of (S, S) households. Then, the aggregate supply of skilled 
workers (and skilled labour services) is  31 2KK + . Although equation (10) defines the 
labour supply of unskilled workers the aggregate supply of unskilled labour services 
is equal to  S hL .   Equating the relative supply of unskilled labour services to the 





21 (1 ) l n (1 ) l n [( 1 ) ( ) EE












   .      (11)                                    
 
Looking at equation (11), we note the presence of the factor-augmenting technology 
terms ( S A  and  ) L A , and the absence of the term capturing the general state of 
technology ( ) A . However, this does not imply, as we will presently see, that neutral 
technological change has no impact on relative wages (the so-called skill premium).   
We normalise by setting  1 w =.  Equation (11) along with the definition of E  () wp =/ 
and the price level -determining equation (5) , solve for the (relative) wage of the 
unskilled  r  and the real (hourly) wage E  (which is the inverse of the price level) of 
unskilled workers. Following the literature, we will refer to r as the skill premium. 
  
3.1  Skill-Biased Technological Change  
In models in which the relative supply of (un)skilled workers is constant, the effects 
of biased (factor-augmenting) technological change depend on the elasticity of 
substitution ( 1 (1 )) σ ρ =/ −  between skilled and unskilled workers ( Acemoglu 
(2002)). If   1( σ >  in which case,  (0 1]) ρ∈ , , then an increase in the (relative) 
productivity of skilled workers ( ) S A , will increase the skill premium. Conversely, if   11
1 σ <  (1 ) =,  then an increase in  S A  will decrease (not change) the skill premium
7. 
Given that the conventional wisdom is that the recent rise in the skill premium is due 
to SBTC, this framework is consistent with the facts, if, and only if,  1 σ >.  However, 
the empirical evidence about the elasticity of substitution is less than clear-cut on this 
issue. In fact, the evidence (see, for example, Eisner and Nadiri (1968), Lucas (1969) 
and the extensive review of the literature in Hammermesh (1993)) suggests that, more 
likely than not, it is less than unity.  
 
In the present paper, the effects of changes in  S A  and  L A  are,                                                                       
 
1 ( 1) (1 2 ) ( 1) 1 1 1 (1 ) 1 ( 1) {( l n ) ( ) ( 1 ) } SS S L L dr dA h r A E h Jr A A A
ρρ ρ ρ ρ ρ ψµ ρ ρ
− /− − /− − − / − /− /= − / / − / ∆   (12) 
                                                                              
1( 1 2 ) / ( 1 ) 1 / ( 1 ) /{ } / ( 1 ) SL S L dE dA J A A A
ρρ ρ ρ µρ ρ
−− − − − =− − ∆                                            (13) 
 
where,  
11 22 (1 ) (1 ) 0 Kz Kz ψ ≡/− +/−>   
1 1 1 1 ( 1) ( 1) 1 ( 1) ( 1) (ln ) ( ) (1 ) 0 SS L hE h r A J Er AA
ρρ ρ ρ ρ ρ ρ ψµ ρ
− − − /− − /− −− /− /− ∆≡ + / / − >   
31 2 JK K ≡+ >0  
(1 ) (1 ) (1 ) 0 LS Ar A
ρρ ρρ ρρ µ
−/ − / − −/ − ≡+ >  .                                                                                                      
 
From equation (12) we observe that even if  0 ρ ≤  ( 1 σ ≤ ), it is still possible for skill-
biased technological change (i.e., a rise in  S A ) to result in an increase in the skill 
premium. This occurs because the technological improvement can lead to a rise in the 
real wage of unskilled workers, thus inducing an increase in the relative supply of 
unskilled workers. We indeed note from equation (13) that when the elasticity of 
substitution between skilled and unskilled workers is less than (or equal to) one 
( 0 ρ ≤ ), then the real wage of unskilled workers increases in response to SBTC. We 
thus conclude that in our framework, SBTC can explain the rise in the skill premium 
                                                 
7 A way to understand the difference in results caused by a low elasticity of substitution is to consider 
the extreme case of a Leontief production function (σ =0). In that case, an increase in   S A  is 
equivalent to creating an “excess supply” of skilled workers since the number of unskilled workers is 
given, and it results in a decrease in the relative wage of skilled workers.   12
for empirically relevant values of the elasticity of substitution between skilled and 
unskilled workers.     
 
Nevertheless, as both both Gordon (2002) and Card and DiNardo(2002) have  argued, 
the hypothesis of SBTC faces some problems in accounting for some of the shifts in 
the structure of wages that have occurred in the United States. A fundamental problem 
for the SBTC hypothesis is that wage inequality stabilized before 1990, despite 
continuing advances in information technology. The hypothesis of SBTC also does 
not  explain why most of the rise in hourly wage-inequality occurred by 1984, the 
year that the IBM-AT was introduced. It also fails to explain the fall during the 1980s 
of the  wage of college graduates with the strongest computer skills (e.g. computer 
science and electrical engineering) relative to the wage of social science graduates, 
despite a rise in the relative supply of social science graduates (see,  OECD (2002)). 
These observations notwithstanding, there exists some doubt about whether  the 
information revolution of the last 20 years can indeed be classified as SBTC, in the 
sense of augmenting the productivity of skilled (i.e., college educated) workers 
relative to the productivity of unskilled workers. It is usually alleged that in many 
countries (the US being the prime example) there is an undergoing transformation into 
a knowledge-age, computer-driven economy, one in which there is increasing 
emphasis on the command of knowledge, information, and the ability to harness the 
power of micro-processors. This transformation, is alleged, generates a technology-
driven increased demand for individuals whose education and skills are able to exploit 
the new technologies. 
 
Some authors (e.g., Gordon (2002)) have expressed doubts about the likelihood of 
SBTC as conventionally portrayed. Their doubts are also strengthened  by the 
following two pieces of evidence from the United States. First, Hecker (1992) found 
that the proportion of college graduates aged 25 and older in what he termed “non-
college jobs” increased from 11% in 1970 to 20% in 1990.  Hecker addressed the 
apparent paradox that both college premiums and the proportion of college graduates 
in non-college jobs increased during this period. He considered and rejected the 
argument that large numbers of graduates were of low ability and did not qualify for 
“college-level” jobs.  Instead, he argued that there continued to be an oversupply of 
college graduates relative to the number of college jobs. College graduates were   13
therefore displacing high school graduates in non-college jobs. As a result, the college 
premium was increasing not because there was an increase in the relative demand for 
college graduates, but because high school graduates were earning less. Second, 
McCormick et al. (1996) reported that the proportion of new college graduates 
reporting that their job did not require college-level skills increased continuously from 
24% in 1976 to 44% in 1994. The largest part of the increase (13 of 20 percentage 
points) occurred between 1976 and 1985. Again, this set of observations can hardly be 
reconciled with the view that SBTC was increasing the need for workers with college 
level skills, i.e. workers able to harness and exploit the new technologies.  
 
The above arguments notwithstanding, allowing for recent technological changes to 
impact more on the productivity of unskilled workers (those with a high-school 
degree or less) than on the productivity of skilled workers is by no means far fetched. 
For example, most people would agree that the recent advances in word processing 
have increased the productivity of a professor less than her secretary. By the same 
token, the productivity of car park attendants, bank tellers and supermarket cashiers 
has increased considerably more due to recent electronic advances than, for example, 
the productivity of marketing executives. Equations (14) and (15) portray the effects 
of unskill-biased technological progress on the skill premium and the real wages of 
the unskilled:   
12 11 (1 2 ) ( 1) 1 (1 ) 1 ( 1) (1 ) } {( l n ) ( ) L LS L S L EA dr dA h A E h Jr A A A
ρ ρρ ρ ρ ψµ ρ
− −− − /− / − /− / −/ ∆ /= + /    (14)
                                                                    
1 (2 1)/(1 ) /(1 ) /( 1) (1 2 )/( 1) /{ / ( 1 ) } LL S L dE dA J A r A A
ρ ρρ ρ ρ ρ ρ ρ µρ ρ
− −− − − − − =− + − ∆                (15) 
As equations (14) and (15) reveal, a rise in  L A  can lead both to a rise in the skill 
premium and to a fall in the real wage of the unskilled, if the elasticity of substitution 
is less than one. The latter result is also consistent with the decline of the real wages 
of unskilled workers in the United States since the early seventies (see, Freeman 
(1995)).  
 
3.2 Neutral Technological Change  
An increase in parameter  A is a case of neutral technological progress. In models in 
which the relative supply of (un)skilled workers is constant, a change in  A has no 
effect on the skill premium. We find, instead, that (after setting the initial value of  A   14
equal to one) the effects on the skill premium, r , and on the real wage of the 
unskilled, E , are  
 
/ dr dA h E ψ /= ∆ ln 0 h >  ,   
 
(1 ) (1 )
3 (2 1) ( ) ( 1) 0 SL dE dA K r A A
ρρ ρρ ρ
−/ − / − /= − + / /− ∆ >   
                                    
We thus find that, following a neutral technological progress there will be a rise in the 
skill premium and a rise in the real wage of the unskilled. The rise in the skill 
premium is a consequence of the increase in the (relative) supply of unskilled labour 
which the rise in real wages, as a result of the increase in  A, brings about. It is thus 
possible, in principle, to explain the rise in the skill premium without having to rely 
on the assumption of biased (skilled or otherwise) technological change.   
 
3.3  Hours of  Work       
 
Most economists would agree that Europe and the United States have experienced 
similar technological developments during the last three decades. Nevertheless, there 
have been significant differences in inequality patterns across the Atlantic. Wage 
inequality in, for example, France and Germany, has not increased during the same 
period; in fact it has decreased (Freeman and Katz (1995), Machin and van Reenen 
(1998)). The standard explanation for this divergent behaviour is institutional. For 
example, Krugman (1995) argued that (continental) European labour market 
institutions encourage wage compression, thus limiting the extent of inequality 
increases. The flip side of this argument is that in European countries, the 
unemployment rates of unskilled workers should rise relative to the unemployment 
rates of skilled workers. However, in the European countries, the unemployment rates 
for unskilled workers did not rise faster than the unemployment rates for skilled 
workers (Nickell and Bell (1996)), and unskilled employment did not grow faster in 
the United States than in the European economies (Card et al (1999)).  
 
In addition to technological progress, many countries have also experienced 
continuous and significant reductions in working time. These reductions have taken   15
many forms, including shorter working days, shorter working weeks, shorter working 
lives, and longer vacations. Maddison (1991), estimates that for the OECD countries 
the number of hours worked per-capita in one year has fallen by about 37% during the 
period 1870-1970. As Table 1 reveals this reduction in working time continued from 
the 1970s to the present day for some OECD countries, with the United States and the 
United Kingdom providing a significant exception to this trend. We will argue that 
this reversal of the trend for the United States and the United Kingdom may also be an 
important factor explaining the recent rise in pay inequality in these countries (and the 
absence of a similar rise in the continental European countries).   
                    
                                  Table 1: Percentage Changes, 1976-1996   
  Germany*   France    UK    Japan   US   
Population         2.1     10.3     5.2     10.8    21.8   
Total Employment         4.9       3.6     5.5     22.4    42.8   
Manufacturing Sector
Employment  
    -3.1    -29.5    -22.2   7.4    -2.8   
Working Time per
Employee (Manufact.)  
    -8.9      -9.3     0.5     -5.0     3.7 
 
* The time interval for Germany is 1973-1990.                                                                          
Sources: ILO Labour Statistics Database, OECD Annual Hours Database.  
 
We now argue that differential developments in the hours of work across the Atlantic 
may provide a partial explanation for the cross-country differences in inequality 
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The skill premium rises in response to a rise in the hours of work since the latter 
change brings about an increase in the relative supply of unskilled labour services. 
The real (hourly) wage rate of the unskilled declines as a consequence, since the 
change in the hours of work is assumed not to have any influence on productivity.    16
We can also calculate the effect on the earnings of unskilled workers (defined as 
Yh E = ). The reader can verify that this effect is ambiguous (i.e., assumptions about 
the elasticity of substitution alone are not enough to sign the  / dY dh expression).  
Work-sharing can thus lead to lower hourly wage inequality but it may also result to 
higher income inequality. 
 
 
In any case, what the above findings suggest is that the continued reduction in the 
hours of work experienced by every OECD country since the start of the 20
th century 
may be a way to explain both the drop in inequality experienced by all countries since 
the 1920s (see, Gordon (2002)) and its rise in the United States and the United 
Kingdom since the 1970s.  
 
4.  Conclusion                                                                                                        
 
  This paper has tried to enquire into the effects of technological change by 
constructing a model in which both relative demand and relative supply of (un)skilled 
workers are potentially influenced by it. The model can potentially explain the rise in 
wage inequality even under the assumption of neutral technological change or even 
when skill-biased technological change is combined with an elasticity of substitution 
between skilled and unskilled workers which is lower than one. Moreover, it can 
partially explain the differences in cross-country patterns of wage inequality  as a 
consequence of  diverging developments regarding the size of work-week across the 
Atlantic. Nevertheless, it shares with many other models the inability to explain both 
the rise in inequality and the fall in the real wages of the unskilled as well as the 
cross-country patterns of these variables without relying on further assumptions about 
the evolution of the relative supplies of (un)skilled workers.   
 
Card and DiNardo (2002) have argued that institutional factors are far more important 
determinants of the evolution of the wage structure. The drop of the real value of the 
minimum wage by more than 30% in 1978 is identified in their study as the 
institutional development explaining most of the rise in US inequality. Combining this 
development in the US with the absence of a similar development in continental 
European countries provides also an empirically plausible explanation for the cross-  17
country patterns of wage inequality. Without wishing to question the relevance of the 
minimum wage explanation, the present paper has also raised the issue of the 
appropriateness of using rigidly defined categories of factors of production, since 
these education-based classifications may not correspond to the tasks actually 
performed by the workers.  The implication of this is that the relationship between 
factor supplies and marginal products may be opposite from what simple-minded 
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